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A NATIONAL STUDY OF THE FURMAN-
COMMUTED INMATES: ASSESSING THE
THREAT TO SOCIETY FROM
CAPITAL OFFENDERS
James W. Marquart *
Jonathan R. Sorensen**
On June 29, 1972, a sharply splintered United States Supreme
Court, in Furman v. Georgia,' struck down the capital sentencing stat-
utes of Georgia and Texas. Justices Brennan and Marshall found that
the death penalty was per se unconstitutional.2 Justices Stewart, Doug-
las, and White found that capital punishment, as then administered
under the statutory schemes of many states, constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.' Justice Stewart
concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed."4 Justice
Douglas echoed this sentiment and stated "[u]nder these laws no stan-
dards govern the selection of the penalty."5 Prior to Furman, defendants
were sentenced to death almost at the whim of jurors under the vague
sentencing guidelines enumerated in most state capital statutes.6 Thus,
this landmark ruling invalidated vague capital sentencing statutes
throughout the United States.
* James W. Marquart is an Associate Professor, College of Criminal Justice, Sam Hous-
ton University. His research emphasizes the long-term consequences of litigation on prison
organizations. He is currently conducting a historical analysis of capital punishment in Texas
from 1924-1988.
** Jonathan R. Sorensen is a doctoral student, College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston
University. His research interests include the legalities of drug testing in criminal justice orga-
nizations, the accuracy of jury predictions in capital cases, and the history of capital punish-
ment in Texas.
Both authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of each state department
of corrections that diligently assembled the data with which this study was conducted.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310
(White, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
6. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 293-97, 313 (1973).
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The Furman ruling also invalidated the death sentences of hundreds
of inmates awaiting execution in thirty states and the District of Colum-
bia.7 The capital offenders affected by the decision had their death
sentences commuted to life imprisonment and were subsequently "re-
leased" into the general prisoner population to serve the remainder of
their sentences.'
Many legislators and criminal justice practitioners were outraged by
the Furman decision.9 Georgia Lieutenant Governor Lester Mattox
stated that the decision amounted to "a license for anarchy, rape, [and]
murder."' Edward Kiernan, then head of the Patrolman's Benevolent
Association, maintained that Furman "struck a blow at our remaining
fabric of law and order."1 Correctional administrators regarded former
death row prisoners as a threat to institutional security and stability. 2
The Furman decision represents an "ideal" natural experiment for
testing such predictions of future dangerousness. Other natural experi-
ments have resulted when court decisions released potentially dangerous
offenders from hospitals for the criminally insane. 13 For example, in
1974 Steadman and Cocozza released a study14 that tracked the behavior
of over 1,000 inmates transferred to civil mental hospitals as a result of
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Baxstrom v. Herold. 5
Similarly, Thornberry and Jacoby analyzed the effects of Dixon v.
Attorney General,6 a ruling that resulted in the release of over 500 pa-
tients from a maximum-security institution for the criminally insane.'
7
The primary conclusion from these two studies was that during confine-
ment and on release in the free community, these offenders who were
7. See infra Table 1 at Section III, A.
8. M. MELTSNER, supra note 6, at 293.
9. See Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in
Futility?, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 12-15 (1973).
10. F. ZIMRING & G. HAVKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA
38 (1986).
11. See Arnold, Parole in Capital Offenses Less Likely, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 1,
col. 6.
12. Indeed, some clinicians maintained that "the adjustment [to death row] is likely to
proceed in a socially undesirable direction and may have negative value in accommodations
outside of death row." Gallemore & Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Con-
finement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 171 (1972).
13. H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE (1974); T.
THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE (1979).
14. H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, supra note 13.
15. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
16. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
17. T. THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, supra note 13.
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predicted to be dangerous exhibited little assaultive behavior."8 Most re-
cently, studies in Texas19 and Kentucky20 concluded that the Furman-
commuted inmates in those states did not represent a disproportionate
threat to either the custodial staff, or if released, to the general commu-
nity.2" In both states, recidivism among ex-capital offenders was not
proportionally higher than among offenders convicted of similar
crimes."
This study examines the prison and release behavior of all capital
offenders commuted by Furman. What happened to the former death
row prisoners? How accurate were the long-term predictions of vio-
lence? If released, did these offenders repeat their crimes and return to
prison? Providing answers to these and other questions bears directly on
the justification for capital punishment in many states today-particu-
larly those eight states whose current capital statutes have a "future-dan-
gerousness" provision.23 Such a provision reflects the premise that
incapacitation of capital offenders protects society from future violence
inflicted by those offenders.24 This study is a descriptive analysis of the
institutional and post-release behavior of 558 Furman-commuted in-
mates in thirty states and the District of Columbia. First, we examine
the relevant literature on commuted offenders. Then, we present the
background characteristics of these inmates with special emphasis on the
race of offenders and victims. Next is an in-depth analysis of the institu-
tional behavior of the Furman-commuted inmates that addresses
whether these inmates were a special threat to the custodial staff, other
prisoners, and institutional order. Finally, we examine the patterns of
recidivism among these capital offenders. We conclude with a discussion
18. H. STEADMAN & J. CoCOZZA, supra note 13, at 138-40; T. THORNBERRY & J.
JACOBY, supra note 13, at 178-98.
19. Marquart & Sorensen, Institutional and Postrelease Behavior of Furman-Commuted
Inmates in Texas, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1988).
20. Vito & Wilson, Back from the Dead: Tracking the Progress of Kentucky's Furman-
Commuted Death Row Population, 5 JusT. Q. 101 (1988).
21. Marquart & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 690; Vito & Wilson, supra note 20, at 110.
22. Marquart & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 687-88; Vito & Wilson, supra note 20, at 110.
23. See Worrell, Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: The Quest
for Innocent Authority, 5 BEHAV. Sci. 433, 433-36 (1987). For examples of future dangerous-
ness provisions in capital punishment statutes see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12.7 (West
1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(8) (Supp.
1989).
24. See generally P. Greenwood & A. Abrahamse, Selective Incapacitation (August 1982)
(available at RAND Corp., Santa Monica, California, doc. no. R-2815-NIJ); von Hirsch &
Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation: Some Queries About Research Design and Equity, 12
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 11 (1983-84).
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of recidivism among capital murderers and the accuracy of long-term
predictions of serious violence.
I. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON COMMUTED CAPITAL OFFENDERS
Little systematic research exists examining the behavior of com-
muted capital offenders. The few studies available are summarized in
this section.
A. Commuted Prisoners in the Institution
Not every individual slated for execution is actually put to death.
For a variety of reasons such as insufficient evidence, a coerced confes-
sion, or diminished capacity, some capital offenders have their death
sentences commuted or reduced in severity, typically to life imprison-
ment. For example, in Texas between 1924 and 1964, of the 447 offend-
ers sentenced to death, 362 were executed and eighty-five (19%) were
commuted to life imprisonment.2" Research by Johnson in North Caro-
lina documented that between 1909 and 1953 only 24% of the burglars
and 56% of both murderers and rapists given the death penalty were ever
executed.26 Whether commuted by governor's clemency or by judicial
mandate, these individuals were subsequently released to either the gen-
eral prison population or society.27
Studies of commuted capital offenders suggest that these inmates are
not unusual threats to institutional order and security. Bedau, while
studying capital sentencing patterns in New Jersey, found no information
"alleging unmanageable behavior during incarceration" among the fifty-
five capital offenders who were serving terms of life imprisonment and
released from death row between 1907 and 1960 because of commutation
or reversal of sentence.28 Wagner recently conducted an extensive analy-
sis of the prison behavior of 100 commuted capital offenders (from 1924
to 1971) in Texas.29 He tracked their institutional behavior from 1924 to
1988 and found that eighty commutees did not commit any serious
prison rule violations, such.as murder, aggravated assault, sex by force,
striking a guard, or escape.30 Most served their sentences without inci-
25. Wagner, A Commutation Study of Ex-Capital Offenders in Texas, 1924-1971 (1988)
(unpublished dissertation available at Sam Houston State Univ.).
26. Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 Soc. FORCES 165 (1957).
27. Id. at 166-67.
28. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 46-47
(1964).
29. Wagner, supra note 25.
30. Id. at 32.
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dent, although three of the commuted capital offenders killed four fellow
inmates.31
Although the research literature on commuted offenders in prison is
sparse, it does not suggest that these prisoners are more dangerous, vio-
lent or aggressive than other offenders. If anything, the prison behavior
of commuted capital offenders paralleled that of murderers in general,
the latter group being "settled" prisoners infrequently involved in homi-
cidal or other violent types of behavior.32
B. Recidivism of Commuted Capital Prisoners
Sellin noted that the recidivism of commuted capital offenders was
difficult to ascertain, as they were seldom categorized apart from murder-
ers in general.33 Although systematic research is also lacking on this
topic, available research indicates that commuted prisoners, while on re-
lease, pose no significant threat to society when compared to other simi-
lar offenders.34
In New Jersey and Oregon, Bedau studied the parole performance
of capital offenders given clemency or released by judicial decision.35 Of
thirty-one capital offenders commuted between 1907 and 1960 in New
Jersey, and subsequently released on parole, only one was returned to
prison; this offender was convicted of attempted sodomy and, after his
second release from prison, was then convicted of robbery.3 6 Of the fif-
teen commuted capital offenders released from prison between 1903 and
1964 in Oregon, three (20%) returned to prison for technical violations
or new offenses.3 7 None of these capital offenders in New Jersey or Ore-
gon committed an additional criminal homicide while in prison or on
parole.38
Stanton examined the release behavior of sixty-three first-degree
31. Id. Research by Sellin reveals that the majority of assaults with intent to kill, and
actual prison homicides, occur in states that allow enforcement of the death penalty. T. SEL-
LIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 104-13 (1980). Wolfson also found that of 124 prison homi-
cides in 1973, only seven occurred in non-death penalty states. W. Wolfson, The Patterns of
Prison Homicide (1978) (unpublished dissertation available at Univ. of Penn.).
32. See Flanagan, Time Served and Institutional Misconduct: Patterns of Involvement in
Disciplinary Infractions Among Long-term and Short-term Inmates, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 357
(1980).
33. T. SELLIN, supra note 31, at 103-04.
34. Id. at 113-14.
35. Bedau, Capital Punishment in Oregon, 1903-1964, 45 OR. L. REv. 1 (1965) [hereinaf-
ter Bedau, Capital Punishment]; Bedau, supra note 28.
36. Bedau, supra note 28, at 46-47.
37. Bedau, Capital Punishment, supra note 35, at 32-34.
38. Id.; Bedau, supra note 28, at 47.
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murderers paroled between 1930 and 1961 in New York, sixty-one of
whose sentences were commuted from death to life imprisonment.3 9 He
found that by the end of 1962 only three of these murderers returned to
prison-two for technical parole violations, and one for burglary.40
Wagner tracked the release behavior of eighty-four commuted capital of-
fenders paroled over the course of sixty-four years (1924-1988) in
Texas. 41 Seven were returned to prison for committing new felonies-
two for possession of a firearm, and one each for rape, robbery, aggra-
vated assault, burglary and kidnapping. 42 None of the released inmates
committed a murder while in the free community, and most successfully
completed their parole without incident.43
Thus, recidivism rates for capital offenders are relatively low.' Af-
ter reviewing the evidence, Sellin concluded that capital offenders,
"whether in prison or on parole, pose no special threat to the safety of
their fellowmen. ' '45 Given these data, Bedau maintained that while on
parole, former death row inmates were not menaces to the social order:
There is no reason to believe that the thousands of those sen-
tenced to death by trial courts in this century have been so sen-
tenced because the sentencing authority was shown evidence
that these persons were more dangerous, more likely to assault
and kill in prison or after release, than the many thousands of
other convicts guilty of similar crimes but never sentenced to
death.46
Throughout the United States in the pre-Furman era, a sprinkling of
commuted offenders entered the general prisoner population; most of
these reached the free community. Few researchers have paid attention
to the behavior of these "special" prisoners. However, the Furman deci-
sion represents a unique opportunity to systematically analyze the insti-
tutional and post-release behavior of commuted prisoners. Never before
has such a large and noteworthy group of former capital offenders been
analyzed.
39. Stanton, Murderers on Parole, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 149, 150 (1969).
40. Id.
41. Wagner, supra note 25.
42. Id. at 37.
43. Id. at 38.
44. T. SELLIN, supra note 31, at 120; Stanton, supra note 39, at 152-53.
45. T. SELLIN, supra note 31, at 120.
46. See H. Bedau, Recidivism, Parole, and Deterrence, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 173, 174 (3d ed. 1982).
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II. METHODOLOGY
The first stage in this research was to obtain a list of inmates com-
muted by Furman. Douglas Lyons of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
prepared a "List of Persons on Death Row at Time of Furman."'4 The
list contained thirty states and 613 inmates whose capital sentences were
set aside by the Furman ruling.4" We obtained a copy, telephoned each
state department of corrections, developed a contact person, and ex-
plained our research goals. Next, a letter was forwarded to each contact
person that identified the commutees and outlined the specific objectives
and time frame for data collection. The necessary research agreement
forms were then signed and our research plan was officially approved.
Once the research was formally approved we forwarded code sheets
to the contact persons for data collection. These sheets covered six data
categories:
1. current status (e.g., still in prison, paroled, deceased);
2. previous felony convictions;
3. total number of prior incarcerations;
4. prison disciplinary history;
5. victim information for the crime for which the defendant
received the death penalty; and
6. whether the crime was committed in the commission of an-
other felony.
According to the contact persons, the majority of the data was com-
puterized and easily accessible; however, some data (i.e., previous convic-
tions and complete disciplinary history) had to be retrieved manually.
Some states, for example Georgia, simply supplied us with a printout of
the necessary data. Other states, such as Arkansas, sent entire copies of
the inmates' institutional files. Once the contact person filled out the
code sheets, they were returned for analysis. Data on 558 prisoners was
obtained from twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia.
III. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FURMAN-COMMUTED
OFFENDERS
Although we began this project with a list of the Furman-com-
mutees, the list was both incomplete and overinclusive. In a previous
study of the Furman-commuted inmates in Texas, we identified forty-
seven inmates as having been physically present on death row at the time
47. Unpublished study from NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. (1982) [hereinafter
Lyons List].
48. Id.
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of the ruling.4 9
The list compiled by Lyons, however, noted that fifty-two Texas
prisoners were affected by Furman.0 Undoubtedly, some of the individ-
uals on his list were still in county jails awaiting transfer to death row or
at the time of the decision had their cases on appeal. More important,
eight inmates housed on death row and commuted by the decision were
not included in Lyons' list. These "missing eight" were physically on
death row at the time of Furman. Other inconsistencies have been dis-
covered in Kentucky and Florida."'
In several states, prison records of persons on the Lyons list could
not be found. In other states, additional commuted offenders were
found. To obtain the most "accurate" figure possible, we instructed our
contact persons to match Lyons' list with institutional death row records
wherever possible. If such records were not available, then the inmates'
institutional files had to contain death row records that documented the
prisoners' presence on death row. The death row files contained offense
information, communication documents, and institutional histories. For
the current study, a "Furman inmate" had to be confined on death row
in 1972.
A. Region and State
Table 1 presents a state by state listing of how many capital offend-
ers had their sentences commuted by Furman. We give both Lyons' and
our figures.
According to both lists, most of the death row population in 1972
resided in Southern prison systems. These data are consistent with previ-
ous research on region and capital punishment in America.5 2 In Decem-
ber 1988, 59% of those sentenced to death were confined on Southern
death rows.53 All Furman-commuted prisoners sentenced to death for
rape and robbery were also from the South.
The data in Table 1 reveal a discrepancy of twenty-four inmates-
excluding Illinois data that was not provided. We suggest that our com-
pilation is the most accurate due to our criterion that the prisoner be
49. Marquart & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 681.
50. Lyons List, supra note 47.
51. See Vito & Wilson, supra note 20, at 103; Garr, Forgotten Killers Up for Parole, Miami
Review, August 30, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
52. See W. BowERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-
1982 (1984).
53. Unpublished study from NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. (1988).
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TABLE 1: REGION AND STATE COMPARISON By LIST
State Lyons' List Our Study
Murder Rape Total# Murder Rape Total#
TOTAL 527 82 613 474 80 558
NORTHEAST 59 0 59 61 0 61
Connecticut 4 0 4 4 0 4
Massachusetts 23 0 23 25 0 25
New Hampshire 2 0 2 2 0 2
New York 5 0 5 5 0 5
Pennsylvania 25 0 25 25 0 25
MIDWEST 123 0 123 88 0 88
Illinois 31 0 31 - - 0*
Indiana 9 0 9 9 0 9
Kansas 2 0 2 2 0 2
Missouri 16 0 16 16 0 16
Nebraska 2 0 2 2 0 2
Ohio 63 0 63 59 0 59
WEST 25 0 25 25 0 25
Colorado 2 0 2 2 0 2
Nevada 8 0 8 8 0 8
Utah 5 0 5 5 0 5
Washington 10 0 10 10 0 10
SOUTH 320 82 406** 300 80 384**
Alabama 26 5 31 26 5 31
Arkansas 6 0 6 6 0 6
Delaware 3 0 3 3 0 3
District of Columbia 3 0 3 1 0 1
Florida 73 29 102 71 29 100
Georgia 29 12 43** 27 12 40**
Kentucky 21 0 21 21 0 21
Louisiana 36 12 48 29 10 39
Maryland 18 5 23 18 5 23
Mississippi 9 0 9 9 0 9
North Carolina 9 2 11 8 2 10
Oklahoma 15 0 15 15 0 15
South Carolina 10 1 11 10 1 11
Tennessee 11 5 16 11 5 16
Texas 42 8 52** 37 7 47**
Virginia 9 3 12 8 4 12
* Illinois did not complete the codesheets. However, an official stated that of the thirty-one
Illinois offenders, nineteen have never been released from prison, ten have been discharged,
and two have been paroled. No releasees have returned to prison.
** Includes four robbers. The NAACP listed two robbers from Georgia and two from
Texas. In the current survey, however, one robber was from Georgia and three were from
Texas.
physically present on death row in 1972; agency officials assured us that
the figures reflected this criterion.
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B. Offender Characteristics
According to our data, there were 558 inmates (excluding Illinois)
on death row awaiting execution in 1972 who were commuted as a result
of Furman. Of these inmates, 474 (85%) were capital murderers, eighty-
one (14%) were rapists, and four (1%) were sentenced to death for
armed robbery. In terms of race and ethnicity, 309 (55%) prisoners were
black, 240 (43%) were white, eight (1%) were hispanic, and one was an
American Indian. As expected, the capital offenders were overwhelm-
ingly male (only two were female), with a median age of thirty-two years
in 1972.
We asked each state prison system to provide data on the prisoners'
prior criminal history. According to our contact persons, these data
were gleaned from initial classification interviews and cross- checked with
FBI and local state police records. Table 2 presents this information.
TABLE 2. CRIMINAL HISTORY OF THE FURMAN-COMMUTEES
White Nonwhite Total
(N=240) (N=318) (N=558)
Prior Record
Convicted of UCR offense * 56.9% 52.7% 54.5%
Convicted of UCR property
offense 46.3% 38.8% 42.1%
Convicted of UCR violent
offense 24.5% 28.7% 26.8%
Prior adult prison
incarceration 45.5% 33.1%** 38.6%
Prior jail term 31.7% 29.2% 30.3%
Prior juvenile incarceration 22.1% 24.7% 23.6%
* Offense documented by the Uniform Crime Reports.
•* Chi square = 4.05 d.f. = 1 p < .05 level.
These data reveal that the majority of commuted offenders had been
convicted of a prior UCR offense.54 They were not first offenders. How-
ever, these conviction data also show that property crimes were their
main criminal activity. Nearly three-quarters had no prior convictions
for violent UCR offenses. Specifically, 97% had no previous conviction
54. A UCR offense is an offense documented in the Uniform Crime Reports. See FBI
UNIFORM CRIME REP. (published annually).
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for murder, 96% for rape, 87% for armed robbery, and 85% for aggra-
vated assault.55 Additionally, 61% of these inmates had never been in-
carcerated in an adult correctional institution. In short, the typical
Furman-commutee was a southern male black murderer without a
lengthy history of serious violence or repeated trips to prison.
IV. OFFENSE DATA
In this section we compare the death row population in 1972 with
aggregate UCR arrest data for homicide from the years 1968-1972.
These latter data, while less than ideal, serve as a crude "control" group.
Where possible we relate our findings to prior research that also serves as
a "control." The first section examines the capital murderers, while the
second focuses on the rapists.
A. The Furman Murderers
Bowers suggested that much of the research on capital offenders in
the pre-Furman era examined the racial characteristics of those executed,
in an attempt to uncover discrimination and differential sentencing pat-
terns between whites and non-whites.56 However, while studies of rape
and racial discrimination are available, little systematic research has ex-
amined the effect of race on the imposition of the death penalty for mur-
der in the pre-Furman years.57
Table 3 compares the Furman-releasees with persons arrested for
murder during the preceding five years. While not offering conclusive
evidence, these data provide support for the differential sentencing of
capital offenders-in this case murderers. Clearly, capital juries consist-
ently sentenced to death those defendants who killed whites. While a
direct comparison between the groups is not possible, the differential
treatment of male and female homicide offenders has been shown repeat-
edly and exists in pre-Furman and post-Furman periods. In the five
years prior to 1972, 16% of those arrested for murder were women, yet
less than 1% were on death row at the time of the Furman decision.58
During 1968-1972, an average of 22% of the victims of homicide were
female. However, victims of death row inmates were female in 33% of
the homicides.
55. In 1987, 88.8% of the prisoners on death row had never been convicted of a prior
homicide. BUREAU JUST. STATISTICS BULL., U.S. DEP'T JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1987
(July 1988).
56. W. BOWERS, supra note 52, at 67-102.
57. T. SELLIN, supra note 31, at 63-64.
58. See Table 3.
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Table 3 also presents data on those currently housed on death row.
Today's death row population is somewhat dissimilar from the Furman
prisoners. The majority of death row inmates are white males. Interest-
ingly, 38% of today's victims were non-white, as compared to 20% in
the Furman era. Perhaps prosecutors are more sensitive to minority vic-
tims of felony-murders than they were two or even three decades ago.
Authorities may simply be more willing to prosecute these cases today.
To obtain a more focused picture of the capital murderer, we col-
lected data on the victims of the Furman murderers. Table 4 presents
data on these crimes.
These data indicate that white and non-white offenders were quite
similar in terms of the number of victims, and the sex and age of the
victim. By far the most striking difference between white and non-white
murderers was the victim's race. White offenders killed whites in almost
every circumstance. However, non-white offenders "crossed over" 65%
of the time and were subsequently sentenced to death. This pattern of
differential sentencing is also evident in Table 3. Less than half of the
homicide victims during the five years prior to Furman were white.
However, victims of offenders on death row were overwhelmingly (80%)
white. Based on the victim's race, our data suggest bias and arbitrariness
in the processing of capital murder cases.5 9
If racial discrimination occurs through interaction with other vari-
ables, one would expect that non-white and white offenders on death row
would have different background characteristics. Data would show that
non-whites are less violent than whites, or that the circumstances of the
crime were not as grave for non-whites to become death row inmates.
However, data in this paper reveal that non-whites typically had more
violence in their backgrounds and their capital offenses were more seri-
ous in that they occurred in the course of another felony.
B. The Furman Rapists
In the first several decades following the Civil War Reconstruction
era, executions consisted mainly of lynchings of blacks convicted of
crimes against whites.' The penalty served to reassert social distance-
59. See Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 Soc. FORCES
369 (1941); Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS 93 (1941).
60. See A. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING (1933); N. TEETERS & J. HEDBLOM,
HANG BY THE NECK (1967).
61. Phillips, Exploring Relations Among Forms of Social Control: The Lynching and Exe-
cution of Blacks in North Carolina, 1889-1918, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 361, 364 (1987).
62. See, eg., C. MAGNUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 274-370 (1940); G. MYR-
DAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 547-59 (1944).
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TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF FURMAN-MURDERERS, PERSONS
ARRESTED FOR MURDER ONLY 1968-1972, AND THE CURRENT
DEATH Row POPULATION
Furman Arrestees* Current**
Death Row
(N=474) (N=64,337) (2,158)
Offender Characteristics
Sex
Male 99.6% 84.3% 98.9%
Female 0.4% 15.7% 1.1%
Race
White 47.5% 36.8% 51.8%
Non-white 52.5% 63.2% 48.2%
Victim Characteristics
Sex
Male 67.4% 78.0% 56.0%
Female 32.6% 22.0% 44.0%
Race
White 80.2% 44.4% 61.9%
Non-white 19.8% 55.6% 38.1%
* Source: FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REP., 1968-1972.
** Source: Tanya Coke and Karima Wicks of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund.
and social control-between the racial groups and to primarily "protect"
whites.61 Early twentieth century trials appeared to be a continuation of
the same process. Lawyers, social scientists, and other authors have
noted discrimination occurring in these instances.6 2 As a Southern stu-
dent of law wrote:
One has only to visit a Southern community at a time
when some Negro is on trial for the rape or murder of a white
person to obtain a vivid picture of the hate and passion and
desire for vengeance which is often aroused in the hearts of the
southern whites.... Under circumstances of this kind it is
rather difficult for the jury or even the judge to escape being
influenced by the feeling which permeates the throng.6 3
Statistics support the sentiment that the death penalty has been im-
63. C. MAGNUM, supra note 62, at 274.
November 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
TABLE 4. VICTIM-OFFENDER RELATIONSHIP BY RACE OF
OFFENDER
White Nonwhite
Offenders Offenders Total
(N=225) (N=249) (N=474)
Offense Characteristics
Multiple Victims 20.3% 16.7% 18.4%
Sex of Victim
Male 64.7% 69.9% 67.4%
Female 35.3% 30.1% 32.6%
Median age of victim 38 34 37
Race of victim
White 95.2% 65.5%* 80.5%
Nonwhite 4.8% 34.5% 19.5%
Victim-offender relationship
Stranger 42.0% 60.8%** 52.3%
Law enforcer 13.0% 13.9% 13.5%
Acquaintance 29.0% 20.5% 24.3%
Family 15.9% 4.8% 9.9%
Committed during a felony 50.0% 64.4%*** 58.0%
* Chi square = 45.6 d.f. = 1
** Chi square = 13.18 d.f. = 1
* Chi square = 7.07 d.f. = I
< .00001
< .0005
< .01
posed in a discriminatory manner, especially in rape cases. The definitive
work on racial discrimination and the imposition of capital punishment
for rape prior to 1972 was conducted by Wolfgang and Riedel.' That
study reported the following: of the 3,859 persons executed for all crimes
since 1930, 54.6% have been black or members of other minority
groups.65 Of the 455 executed for rape alone, 89.5% have been non-
white. 6
The researchers collected data from 230 counties in eleven southern
states, including every rape conviction (over 3,000) in those counties
from 1945-1965.67 Analyzing the dispositions of 1,265 cases in Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee, they found that
nearly seven times as many blacks were sentenced to death as whites,
64. Wolfgang and Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS
119 (1973).
65. Id. at 123.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 127.
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13% (110 of 823) versus 2% (9 of 442), and when victims of black of-
fenders were white, the margin was even greater.68 In a more detailed
examination of Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee from 1945 to 1965, they
found that blacks convicted of raping whites were disproportionately sen-
tenced to death.69
Our data reveal a clear pattern of discrimination that parallels the
findings of Wolfgang and Riedel. Of the eighty rapists on death row at
the time of the Furman decision, all were incarcerated in southern prison
systems. Furthermore, sixty-eight (85%) were non-white.7° The victims
of these offenses were overwhelmingly white (91% of the instances).
Most of these offenses (81%) involved a lone victim, who was unknown
to the assailant (78% of the offenses). Most of the rapists lacked a prior
record. Only 5% had a previous rape conviction, while 29% had been
confined in an adult penitentiary for any crime. Nationwide, during
1968-1972, an average of 51% of persons arrested for rape were non-
white.71 Of the Furman-commuted offenders, 85% were non-white.
V. INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR
Custodial officers, psychiatrists and prison administrators feared the
release of the Furman-commuted inmates into the general prisoner popu-
lation.72 Many believed that these former death row prisoners were dif-
ferent than other inmates and represented a unique security risk. 3 In
this section, we analyze the institutional disciplinary behavior of the
Furman offenders from 1972-1987. We begin with an explanation of
what are termed serious rule violations and then focus specifically on
chronic and violent rule violators in order to determine whether predic-
tions of violent institutional behavior among Furman-commuted inmates
were accurate.
68. Id. at 126-30.
69. Id. at 131-32.
70. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the United States Supreme Court declared
that the death penalty for rape was unconstitutional, because it was excessive punishment for
the crime. Id. at 592.
71. 1968 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 13; 1969 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 12-13; 1970
FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 14; 1971 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 14; 1972 FBI UNIFORM
CRIME REP. 14.
72. Interview with ex-warden of Texas prison system in Huntsville, Texas (September,
1987) (name withheld upon request).
73. For instance, one classification and records officer from Texas whom we interviewed
predicted that the Furman inmates would commit serious acts of violence and generally be a
disruptive element in the prison setting. Interview with Texas classification officer in Hunts-
ville, Texas (September, 1987) (name withheld upon request).
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A. Serious Rule Violations
The definition of serious rule violations and the classification of
these offenses vary between states. To insure coder reliability, we desig-
nated three major generic categories of offenses: offenses against other
prisoners such as murder and fighting with weapons; offenses against
prison staff such as striking a guard; and offenses against institutional
order such as inciting riots or work strikes. The main problem with this
approach is that the same offense category may reflect variation from
state to state. While some of the categories, e.g., aggravated assault on
an inmate without a weapon, are open to a certain amount of interpreta-
tion that could have inflated reporting, other categories involving weap-
ons and homicides are not amenable to subjective judgments.74 In these
latter cases, the offense categories were consistent and valid.
Table 5 presents the number of serious rule violations for Furman-
commuted murderers and rapists and the percentage of each group in-
volved in those violations.
The data in Table 5 indicate that over a fifteen-year period, slightly
less than one-third of the former death row inmates committed serious
prison rule violations. Over one-half (84 or 51.9%) of those inmates
committing serious rule violations were involved in only one rule viola-
tion, and another quarter (38 or 23.5%) were involved in only two rule
violations. These data demonstrate, at least among these violators, that
most serious infractions were one-time events or situations. In short,
most of the Furman inmates were not violent menaces to the institutional
order. As a group, they were not a disproportionate threat to guards and
other inmates.
B. Chronic Rule Violators
A small group of chronic offenders, forty inmates (7.4% of the total
for whom disciplinary information was available) were involved in three
or more serious rule violations, accounting for more than one-half of the
total serious rule violations. Each of these forty inmates (thirty-six mur-
derers and four rapists) committed an average of 5.1 serious rule viola-
tions over the fifteen-year period. This finding supports previous studies
which have shown that within the prison community, as in the free
world, a small group of offenders accounts for the majority of offenses."
74. The categories of homicide and attacks with weapons were standard across the various
state prison systems.
75. See Fox, Analysis of Prison Disciplinary Problems, 49 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, &
POLICE Sci. 321, 324 (1958); Ramirez, Race and Apprehension of Inmate Misconduct, 11 J.
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TABLE 5. NUMBER OF SERIOUS RULE VIOLATIONS BY CRIME*
Murderers
(Valid N=453)
Rapists
(N=80)
Offense
Prisoner-Prisoner Acts
Homicide
Aggravated Assault with a
Weapon
Aggravated Assault without a
Weapon
Aggressive Sexual Attacks
Prisoner-Staff Acts
Homicide
Aggravated Assault with a
Weapon
Aggravated Assault without a
Weapon
Acts Against Institutional Order
Escape
Rioting
Work Strike
Total Offenses
4 (0.9%) 0
29 (4.4%)
113 (11.7%)
20 (2.4%)
2 (0.4%)
17 (2.4%)
30 (4.6%)
(12.6%)
(4.9%)
(0.7%)
(30.2%)
* Of the four armed robbers in the study, none committed any serious rule violations.
C. Violent Rule Violators
For the purposes of this study, violent rule violators were defined as
those prisoners who committed murders and weapon-related aggravated
assaults on prison staff or other inmates. Overall, the Furman offenders
committed six killings in the institutional setting. The four prisoner
homicides occurred in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania.
Both prison guard murders occurred in Ohio. Further, all six institu-
tional killers were serving time for capital murder. Two of these murder-
ers were again sentenced to death, one for the murder of an inmate in
Florida, and the other for the murder of a correctional officer in Ohio.
Of the other fifty-nine serious acts of violence, thirty-eight inmates
CRIM. JUST. 413, 418 (1983); Wolf, Freinek & Shaffer, Frequency and Severity of Rule Infrac-
tions as a Criteria of Prison Maladjustment, 22 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 244, 246 (1966).
6 (6.3%)
(17.5%)
(1.3%)
0
0
4 (5.0%)
(6.3%)
(1.3%)
(31.3%)
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(thirty-three murderers and five rapists) were involved. We investigated
the differences between inmates committing serious violent acts and
those who did not.
Neither offense characteristics (including whether the act was com-
mitted in the commission of another felony or the victim-offender rela-
tionship) nor the offender's- race, age, or prior criminal history
significantly differed between those who committed violent acts and
those who did not. In short, no variable served as a predictor of these
violent acts.
VI. PAROLE BEHAVIOR
Perhaps the greatest fear expressed after the Furman decision was
that commuted inmates would someday be released to society and com-
mit more heinous crimes. Enough of these inmates have been released to
society so that predictions made in 1972 regarding their propensity to-
ward violence on the community at large can be assessed. This section
describes the behavior following release of the former death-row inmates.
The following section compares rates of recidivism of Furman-commuted
murderers and rapists to recidivism rates for offenders convicted of simi-
lar crimes who were not originally sentenced to death.
A. The Parolees
Of the 558 Furman-commuted inmates, 315 (56.5%) have not been
released from prison. Of those, thirty-nine died, and three escaped and
have not been recaptured. Two hundred forty-three (44%) of the capital
offenders have been released to society. Of these, 191 (78.6%) have not
been returned to prison: 147 are on their original parole, 19 discharged
their sentences, 17 successfully completed their parole, 6 died in the com-
munity, and 2 were pardoned. Fifty-two (21%) of the releasees returned
to prison for technical violations or new offenses. Of these, forty-two are
currently incarcerated, eight have been re-paroled, and two have died in
prison.
In the following analyses, those prisoners who have died or escaped
will not be considered. Neither of the two females have been paroled.
Very few of the chronic and violent prison rule violators have been pa-
roled and those that were spent an average of nine and one-half years in
the general prisoner population prior to release. Table 6 reports the
number of parolees by region and crime.
As can be seen in Table 6, every armed robber and two-thirds of the
rapists were released from confinement. Releases were most commonly
[Vol. 23:5
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TABLE 6. RELEASE FROM PRISON BY REGION AND CRIME*
Region Never Released Released
SOUTH
Murder 51.6% (142) 48.4% (133)
Rape 35.4% (28) 64.6% (51)
Armed Robbery 0 100.0% (4)
MIDWEST* 56.1% (46) 43.9% (36)
NORTHEAST* 81.5% (44) 18.5% (10)
WEST* 59.1% (13) 40.1% (9)
Total 52.9% (273) 47.1% (243)
* Furman inmates in these three regions were all convicted of capital murder.
granted in the southern states, and least often in the northeast. However,
inmates have been released from confinement in all but three states.76
Unlike inmates in states with life-without-parole sentencing stat-
utes,77 nearly all of the Furman inmates are eligible and will soon be
reviewed for parole. Of those not yet released, almost every expected
parole date for these inmates is set for the early 1990s.
How have the Furman-releasees fared on parole? Did these capital
offenders present a great risk to society? Table 7 reports the percentages
of the murderers and rapists who were released and returned to prison or
recidivated (percent of offenders convicted of new crimes or returned to
prison for technical violations).
The released Furman-commuted offenders have lived a combined
total of 1282 years in the community while committing twelve violent
offenses-approximately two violent offenses per year for the released in-
mates or nine violent offenses per 1,000 releasees per year. Recidivism
occurred an average of 3.4 years after release for murderers and 2.5 years
for rapists. Of the 239 paroled offenders, one killed again. Two rapists
raped again.
To determine if this level of recidivism is excessive for these
criminals, we compared them to a like group of offenders, specifically
other murderers. Bedau cites various data on the release behavior of pa-
76. Life terms in these three states in 1972 generally allowed parole after serving 10 to 20
years, including good time. Only Kansas, with two Furman-commuted inmates, indicated that
those inmates were not eligible for parole without an executive pardon.
77. See Cheatwood, The Life-Without-Parole Sanction: Its Current Status and a Research
Agenda, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 43 (1988).
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TABLE 7. TOTAL RECIDIVISM BY OFFENSE*
[Vol. 23:5
Release Outcome Murderers Rapists
Total Released 188 (43.4%) 51 (64.6%)
Mean Time in Community 5.3 years 5.6 years
Recidivated 38 (20.2%) 13 (25.5%)
Technical Violations 15 (8.0%) 4 (7.8%)
Misdemeanor 3 (1.6%) 0
New Felony Offense 20 (10.6%) 9 (17.6%)
Murder 1 0
Rape 0 2
Robbery 4 2
Aggravated Assault 1 2
Burglary 4 2
Larceny-Theft 3 0
Possession of firearms 2 0
Drugs 4 1
Indecency with a child 1 0
* Of the four armed robbers released, one returned to prison in 1987 for commiting an
armed robbery.
roled murderers. 78 The data show that, overall, only a small percentage
(less than 1%) of released murderers were returned to prison for commit-
ting a subsequent homicide. For example, of 11,532 murderers released
between 1971 and 1975, twenty-six committed new homicides in the first
year after release from prison.79 However, our data reveal that after five
years on parole, only one murderer committed a second murder while in
the larger society. Though these data are not conclusive, they do suggest
that the capital murderers on parole do not represent a disproportionate
threat to the larger society.
The data in this study parallel other recidivism research on murder-
ers in general."0 While murderers on parole appear to rarely repeat their
original crime, more research on these released offenders is needed. We
agree with Bedau's conclusion on this point:
78. H. Bedau, supra note 46, at 175-80.
79. Id. at 179.
80. See Donnelly & Bala, 1977 Releases: Five Year Post Release Follow-Up, ALBANY,
N.Y., DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERV. (1984); Auerbach, Common Myths About Capital
Criminals and Their Victims, 3 GA. J. CORRECTIONS 41 (1974); Wallerstedt, Returning to
Prison, in BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS SPECIAL REP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (1984).
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While not complete, these data studies of murderers on pa-
role are encouraging. Although they prove that the popular
belief is true, that murderers do sometimes kill again even after
years of imprisonment, the data also show that the number of
such repeaters is very small. Both with regard to the commis-
sion of felonies generally and the crime of homicide, no other
class of offender has such a low rate of recidivism. So we are
left to choose among clear alternatives. If we cannot improve
release and parole procedures so as to turn loose no one who
will commit a further murder or other felony, we have three
choices. Either we can undertake to execute every convicted
murderer; or we can undertake to release none of them; or we
can reconcile ourselves to the fact that release procedures, like
all other human practices, are not infallible, and continue to
improve rehabilitation and prediction during incarceration.81
Given the amount of time these parolees have spent in the free com-
munity (an average of five years), their overall post-release behavior takes
on great significance when evaluating the incapacitation effect of the
death penalty. Murder is the prime concern. Incapacitation advocates
would insist that the execution of every Furman-offender would have
prevented the one subsequent murder referred to above. Further, the
executions would have prevented six prison murders (four inmates and
two guards). This evidence supports permanent incapacitation as a
means to prevent future capital crimes.82 However, four inmates on
death row at the time of Furman were innocent according to a study by
Bedau and Radelet. These four individuals could possibly have been
executed had it not been for Furman.
At the same time, incapacitation advocates might argue that the
death row experience itself was prophetic and acted as a deterrent that
kept more of the Furman-releasees from killing again. That is, the
Furman inmates were so close to death that they straightened up their
act out of fear. Although this possibility seems far-fetched and self-serv-
ing, it is a viable explanation for the behavior of some prisoners. For
example, a Furman inmate in Texas, a double murderer who has never
been released from prison, wrote us and explained that his good prison
conduct and overall positive outlook on life was the direct result of his
81. H. Bedau, supra note 46, at 175-80.
82. See Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other Than Deterrence, 14 CRIM.
L. BULL. 34, 37-40 (1978).
83. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 21, app. B at 177 (1987).
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time spent on death row. Moreover, this capital murderer has over the
years completed more than a dozen furloughs successfully.
While execution would certainly have prevented seven additional
murders, our data also show that 551 prisoners, or 98%, did not kill
either in prison or in the free community. The vast majority served their
time in prison with few challenges to the prison staff. Moreover, most of
those released on parole were not menaces to the social order. The death
row experience alone cannot account for deterring 551 inmates spread
across thirty states. What can account for this fact?
In 1972, the average age of the Furman inmates was thirty-one
years. These inmates were generally older than other "incoming" prison-
ers. Some had spent five, six, or even seven years on death row prior to
commutation and this confinement eased their adjustment upon return to
the general prisoner population. If anything, the death row experience
was a learning experience. While confined on "the row," these prisoners
learned how to survive in prison and how to "do time." When released
to the general prisoner population in 1972, they were already
"prisonized" and acclimated to institutional life. This minor adjustment
translated into relatively few disciplinary infractions. The disciplinary
data reported earlier support this point.8 4 The Furman prisoners repre-
sented an "older" cadre of convicts well-adapted to the penitentiary.
We also suggest that the commutees as a group were older upon
release to the free community. Excluding time on death row, the average
time spent in prison before release was nine and one-half years. There-
fore, these prisoners as a group were over forty years old when released
from prison. We are suggesting that the most important variable ex-
plaining the Furman-offenders' low rate of recidivism in the free commu-
nity is age, or the aging process and its effect on future criminal
activity."5 In other words, the dual effects of long prison terms (incapaci-
tation) and aging on these offenders-presumably the high risk offend-
ers-effectively reduced their potential for future criminal activity.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In 1972, the historic Furman v. Georgia86 decision held that the
death penalty as then administered constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment.17 Jurors, afforded too much discretion in their deliberations and
84. See supra at Section V.
85. See Hirschi & Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc. 552
(1983).
86. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
87. IM at 239-40 (per curiam).
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sentencing, reflected unusual amounts of arbitrariness and capricious-
ness. 8 The United States Supreme Court's decision invalidated the
death sentences of capital felons on the death rows of thirty states and
the District of Columbia.
8 9
Many in the criminal justice community feared the worst from the
former death row inmates. 90 The goal of this research was to contribute
to death penalty theory by ascertaining what happened to the Furman-
commuted inmates across this country. Did the Furman inmates pose a
significant threat to the prison and outside community?
While there is some ambiguity as to just how many death row pris-
oners were actually affected by Furman, the research reported here ac-
counts for 558 inmates scattered across twenty-nine states and the
District of Columbia.91 We tracked these 558 prisoners' institutional and
release behavior for nearly fifteen years. In the prison setting, these pris-
oners committed six murders-killing four prisoners and two correc-
tional officers.92 However, the majority of the former death row
prisoners served out their sentences with few instances of serious institu-
tional misconduct. A minority were responsible for the bulk of discipli-
nary infractions.
Over the course of fifteen years, 239 Furman-commuted prisoners
were released to the free community. These parolees have spent an aver-
age of five years in society.9 3 Twenty-one percent recidivated and were
returned to prison, 12% committing new felonies.94 Only one parolee
from Texas committed a second homicide.95 On the other hand, nearly
80% of those released to the free society have not, at least officially, com-
mitted additional crimes.
H.L.A. Hart asked: "What is the weight and character of the evi-
dence that the death penalty is required for the protection of society?" 96
This question, in our opinion, is the most salient one in any discussion of
the utility of capital punishment. Seven (1.3%) Furman-commuted pris-
oners were responsible for seven additional murders. Certainly execution
of all 558 prisoners would have prevented these killings. However, such
88. Id. at 248-52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
89. See supra Table 1 at Section III, A.
90. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
91. This "final" figure does not include thirty Illinois prisoners since no official records
could be obtained from that state's department of corrections.
92. See supra at Section V, C.
93. See supra at Section VI, A.
94. See supra at Section VI, A.
95. See supra at Section VI, A.
96. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 71 (1968).
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a "preemptive strike" would not have greatly protected society. In addi-
tion, four innocent prisoners would have been put to death. The question
then becomes whether saving the lives of the seven victims was worth the
execution of four innocent inmates.
The data in this paper suggest that these prisoners did not represent
a significant threat to society. Most have performed well in the prison;
those few who have committed additional violent acts are indistinguish-
able from those who have not. Therefore, over-prediction of secondary
violence is indicated.97 More than two-thirds of the Furman inmates, us-
ing a very liberal definition of violence, were false positives-predicted to
be violent but were not. We cannot conclude from these data that their
execution would have protected or benefitted society.
There are numerous policy implications to be drawn from the data
presented in this paper. We do not suggest that every commuted capital
offender can be released into free society. Some, albeit a minority, cer-
tainly need long-term confinement in maximum security facilities. Life-
without-parole statutes are not the answer either because the indiscrimi-
nate warehousing of these prisoners would not have prevented numerous
killings in free society. What we are suggesting is that the great majority
of the Furman inmates were not violent predators in the prison or free
society. The data presented in this paper suggest that current capital
sentencing schemes predicated on their incapacitation effect, as is the
practice of many states today that include a prediction of future danger-
ousness to justify executions, cannot accomplish their goals accurately or
with a sense of fair play.
97. See F. DUTILE & C. FousT, THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE (1987).
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